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This paper examines a novel form of classification shifting as an earnings management tool 
using a sample of 12,804 UK listed firm-year observations for the 1995-2014 period. It 
proposes a new approach to classification shifting whereby firms have scope to misclassify 
revenues from non-operating activities as operating revenues. The results establish that firms 
engage in classification shifting of non-operating revenues to inflate operating revenues. 
They indicate that firms in the period following mandatory IFRS adoption are associated with 
an increase in this practice, consistent with IFRS offering greater scope for manipulation. 
Further tests reveal that classification shifting of revenues is more pervasive for firms that 
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1. Introduction  
There is a huge literature on earnings management under which accounting information 
can be manipulated in various ways to mask firms’ true economic performance. One recently 
established form of earnings management is classification shifting. This is based on the 
misclassification of items within the income statement but does not alter net income. McVay 
(2006) was the first to establish empirical evidence for classification shifting in the context of 
expense items. She found that US firms engage in this practice to manipulate core earnings by 
shifting core expenses from the cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative 
expenses to income-decreasing special items. Subsequent studies have also adduced empirical 
evidence that UK firms (Athanasakou, Strong, & Walker, 2011; Zalata & Roberts, 2016), as 
well as East Asian firms (Haw, Ho, & Li, 2011), misclassify core expenses as non-recurring 
expenses.  
The above studies examine the understatement of core expenses, which typically appear 
in the income statement after sales revenue, for the purpose of increasing core earnings. 
Firms, however, can also overstate core earnings by shifting non-operating revenues to 
operating revenues.1 In this paper, we examine this novel form of classification shifting as an 
earnings management tool. Specifically, we investigate and test whether firms misclassify 
non-operating revenues as operating revenues. The main theoretical motivation why firms 
may engage in classification shifting of revenues is based on investor perception of 
accounting information items. One strand of research proposes that investors assess the 
valuation relevance of earnings components based on their placement in the income statement 
(Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002). This suggests that investors appear to weight 
individual line items in the income statement differently and that operating revenues items 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the paper we use the nomenclature ‘non-operating revenues’ to refer to those revenues that firms 
achieve from non-operating activities (e.g. rental income, interest income) including those from non-recurring 
items (e.g. gains on disposals of assets) whereas operating revenues are defined as the sum of sales revenue and 
other operating revenues.  
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tend to be accorded more weight since they have higher valuation relevance (e.g. Bartov & 
Mohanram, 2014).  
Another related strand of the literature establishes that the ability of an income statement 
line item to predict future earnings depends on its position in the income statement (e.g. 
Fairfield, Sweeney, & Yohn, 1996). In particular, it shows that line items closer to sales 
revenue are more likely to help predict future earnings. In this context, the misclassification of 
revenue items can be employed to boost operating revenues. Indeed, McVay (2006) observed 
that firms may shift non-operating revenues up the income statement but she left this type of 
classification shifting for future research. Furthermore, Curtis, McVay, and Whipple (2014) 
provided some evidence of flagrant opportunism in disclosing core earnings. They showed 
that managers disclose core profit without excluding non-operating revenues especially in 
cases when the inclusion of the latter allows them to meet their core earnings’ benchmark. 
Concern about reclassification has been shown by organisations such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). They were particularly worried about the misclassification of 
income statement line items such as improperly showing investment income or gains on 
disposals of assets as product or service revenue (SEC, 2000). As an anecdotal example, a 
global electrical engineering company ABB that has branches in countries such as the USA 
and the UK was able to misclassify continually revenues from the sale of fixed assets as 
operating revenues (Jones, 2011). Another example is IBM which shifted revenues from non-
recurring items (gains on asset sales) up the income statement to inflate core earnings 
(Bulkeley, 2002).  
  Firms may have more incentives to inflate operating revenues than to understate core 
expenses through misclassification. This is because an increase in operating revenues is more 
valued by investors than a decrease in core expenses (Ertimur, Livnat, & Martikainen, 2003; 
Marguardt & Wiedman, 2004). Furthermore, analysts issue forecasts for sales revenue in 
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addition to core earnings. Managers can more readily meet both of these forecast targets by 
shifting non-operating revenues to sales operating revenues rather than misclassifying core 
expenses as non-recurring expenses. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) and Weiss (2001) 
document that firms are more likely to decrease non-recurring gains to influence investors’ 
perceptions by providing a signal that their earnings are mainly based on recurring operations. 
These firms may reduce transitory gains by shifting them to operating revenues. Existing 
studies find that operating revenues are overestimated via real earnings management by 
offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms (e.g. Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 
2006). Examining classification shifting of revenues complements the previous work and can 
help market participants by alerting them to potential earnings management using revenue 
shifting for inflating operating revenues when a firm does not disclose the components of 
operating and non-operating revenues in its annual report. These factors highlight the 
importance of examining classification shifting of revenues in addition to expense 
misclassification.    
We examine classification shifting of revenues in the context of the UK for two reasons. 
Firstly, UK firms followed Financial Reporting Standard No. 3: Reporting Financial 
Performance (FRS 3) to prepare their income statement under UK GAAP from 1993 until 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. FRS 3 required companies to 
show operating profit and revenues (sales) subtotals separately on the face of the income 
statement but it did not prescribe revenue categories (PWC, 2013). Thus, how they were 
defined was subject to managerial judgement suggesting that firms may have shifted non-
operating revenues such as rental income, ancillary revenues, and investment income to 
operating revenues. Under FRS 3, firms were also required to distinguish between operating 
and non-operating exceptional items and to show only the latter on the face of the income 
statement. This suggests that FRS 3 offered some scope for managements’ opportunistic 
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discretion regarding operating exceptional items (e.g. Choi, Lin, Walker, & Young, 2007), 
and hence firms may have used non-operating revenues from such non-recurring items for 
revenue shifting. Consequently, the flexibility afforded by FRS 3 makes the UK an interesting 
candidate for examining classification shifting of revenues.  
Secondly, UK firms listed on the main stock exchange have followed IFRS since 2005 
whereas those quoted on the Alternative Investment Market were required to adopt IFRS only 
from 2007 (Brochet, Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 2013). IFRS (IAS 1) has very limited disclosure 
requirements and guidance for non-recurring items as it only states that an entity should 
disclose such items either on the face of the income statement or in the notes when they are 
material (Zalata & Roberts, 2016). Furthermore, there is a specific standard on revenue, IAS 
18, which defines revenue as ‘the gross inflow of economic benefit during the period arising 
in the course of ordinary activities.’ This, as Nobes (2012) has pointed out, allows 
management the opportunity to determine what constitutes revenue. This issue is exacerbated 
because IAS 18 does not define the term ‘ordinary activities’, thus giving managers scope to 
decide what items should be regarded as arising from their ordinary activities. Consequently, 
these aspects of IFRS suggest that it offers high latitude for the misclassification of the 
income statement items, and therefore focusing on the UK offers scope for investigating the 
impact of IFRS on classification shifting of revenues. 
We develop an expectation model for decomposing operating revenues into expected and 
unexpected components similar to McVay’s (2006) core earnings model. Drawing on 12,804 
firm-year observations from all UK listed firms for the 1995-2014 period, we find that non-
operating revenues are associated with an unexpected rise in operating revenues. We also find 
that this increase in operating revenues reverses in the subsequent year. Together, these results 
provide evidence that firms shift non-operating revenues to operating revenues, consistent 
with classification shifting of revenues. The results show that firms engage in such activities 
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to a greater extent after mandatory IFRS adoption, suggesting that the latter offers more 
latitude for these practices compared to UK GAAP. This evidence supports Zalata and 
Roberts (2017) who document that IFRS allows firms to have more managerial discretion on 
the classification of non-recurring items. Further tests reveal that firms reporting operating 
losses or firms with low growth employ a greater degree of classification shifting of revenues. 
Overall, the results suggest that firms engage in classification shifting of revenues to increase 
operating revenues.  
This study contributes to the earnings management literature in several ways. First, we 
extend the classification shifting literature by being the first to provide evidence that 
misclassification takes place not only among expense items (e.g. McVay, 2006) but also 
among revenue items. Second, we extend the mandatory IFRS adoption and earnings 
management literature (Doukakis, 2014) by providing evidence that IFRS increases the use of 
classification shifting among revenue items. Finally, existing studies identify factors that 
affect the extent of using real (accruals) earnings management or expense shifting (Fan & Liu, 
2017; Roychowdhury, 2006). We extend this line of research by providing evidence that 
classification shifting of revenues is more pervasive among firms that report operating losses 
or have low growth.  
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the main 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and discusses the data and sample. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1. Literature review  
Existing studies have examined three earnings management tools (e.g. Jones, 1991; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). These are accruals management, real earnings management, and 
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classification shifting.2 The latter has been the main focus of several recent papers and McVay 
(2006), using a sample of US firms, was first to analyze the possibility of shifting items 
intentionally within the income statement. The main advantage of classification shifting is 
that it does not change bottom line earnings and does not affect long term firm value unlike 
discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. This may limit the scrutiny of auditors 
and regulators. McVay finds that firms engage in classification shifting to increase core 
earnings by examining the relationship between core earnings and income-decreasing special 
items. She explains her results as being due to the shifting of core expenses from the cost of 
goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses to income-decreasing special 
items. Consistent with these results, Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas (2010) find that US 
firms use classification shifting and that managers shift core expenses to income-decreasing 
special items to a greater extent when they cannot manipulate earnings through accruals. 
Furthermore, Barua, Lin, and Sbaraglia (2010) document that US firms employ expense 
shifting using discontinued operations in addition to special items to increase core earnings. 
These studies examine classification shifting of expenses which allow firms to inflate their 
core earnings. However, classification shifting may also be possible by misclassifying non-
operating revenues as operating revenues. This suggests that abnormal core earnings might 
also be driven by the potential for manipulation using classification shifting of revenues.   
Several studies test whether firms outside the USA engage in classification shifting. 
Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker (2009) examine the use of classification shifting under UK 
GAAP. They find that large firms shift small core expenses to operating exceptional or to 
other non-recurring items to overstate core earnings to meet earnings targets. Zalata and 
Roberts (2016) test expense shifting for UK firms under IFRS and their results show that 
firms misclassify recurring expenses as non-recurring items to inflate core earnings. These 
                                                          
2
 Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Kothari (2001) conduct studies that review the discretionary accruals literature 
while a review of the real earnings management literature can be found in Xu, Taylor, and Dugan (2007).   
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studies suggest that UK GAAP and particularly IFRS offer scope for UK firms to misclassify 
income statement line items. This implies that UK firms may also use revenue shifting to 
increase core earnings. Thus, their results may be due to the classification shifting of revenues 
as they examine the association between core earnings and total non-recurring items to test 
expense shifting.  
 Fan and Liu (2017) extend the reclassification research by showing that firms have 
incentives not only to inflate core earnings but also overestimate other top income statement 
line items. In particular, they find that firms misclassify cost of goods sold as income-
decreasing special items to improve their gross margin. Their results underline the importance 
of managing top income statement line items, implying that firms may be motivated to inflate 
operating revenues via classification shifting. Another important contribution of their study is 
that they decompose core expenses into cost of goods sold and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses unlike prior classification shifting studies. Their results indicate that 
firms shift core expenses both from cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative 
expenses to income-decreasing special items for meeting/beating zero core earnings, prior 
period core earnings, and analyst forecasts.  
2.2. Hypothesis development 
This study extends the classification shifting literature by examining whether firms 
misclassify revenue items to increase operating revenues. Firms are likely to have incentives 
to misclassify non-operating revenues as operating revenues in addition to expense shifting 
for a number of reasons. First, classification shifting of revenues inflates operating revenues 
while expense shifting decreases operating expenses. An increase in operating revenues is 
likely to be more appealing to investors than core expense reductions. Anthony and Ramesh 
(1992) and Ertimur et al. (2003) find that investors value a dollar of operating revenues 
surprises more highly than a dollar decrease in core expenses. Moreover, Bradshaw and Sloan 
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(2002) and Davis (2002) document that investors give more value to the sales revenue 
subtotal or to those individual line items in the income statement that are close to it. This 
suggests that operating revenues subtotal is one of the key indicators that investors consider in 
assessing a firm’s financial performance. Second, analysts issue not only core earnings 
forecasts but also sales revenue forecasts. The implication is that if firms engage in revenue 
shifting they can meet sales revenue and earnings forecasts while expense shifting does not 
help them to meet both of these forecasts. Third, those firms that have transitory gains are 
likely to reduce them to signal that their income is mainly based on operating earnings. Such 
firms can reduce their transitory gains by shifting them to operating revenues. Kinney and 
Trezevant (1997) document that firms with gains from non-recurring operations tend to report 
them in footnotes rather than on the income statement to shift attention away from the 
transitory nature of these items. Consistent with this, Weiss (2001) find that firms try to 
decrease their transitory gains by recognizing income-decreasing special items. Fourth, 
showing gains from non-recurring items as part of non-operating activities reduces operating 
earnings which may not allow firms to meet/beat core earnings benchmarks. Shifting 
transitory gains to operating revenues may enable firms to achieve core earnings targets. Hsu 
and Kross (2011) document that firms predominately include transitory gains in core 
earnings; particularly they do this when the inclusion of such items helps to meet/beat zero 
core earnings or prior period core earnings. Similar results are found by Curtis et al. (2014) 
who provide evidence that some managers explicitly disclose core profit but exclude non-
recurring expenses while including transitory gains.  
While the above suggests that firms have incentives for engaging in classification shifting 
of revenues, it is an empirical question as to whether they have the opportunity to do so. The 
scope for firms’ revenue shifting practices depends on the flexibility or strictness of 
accounting standards. UK GAAP (FRS 3) required firms to disclose operating profit and 
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revenues (sales) subtotals separately on the face of the income statement (Lin, 2006). It, 
however, did not prescribe revenue categories implying that their definitions were subject to 
managerial judgement. This suggests that FRS 3 may have offered opportunities for 
management to classify non-operating revenues such as rental income, ancillary revenues, and 
investment income as operating revenues.3  
FRS 3 also required companies to distinguish between income from operating and non-
operating exceptional items and to show the latter on the face of the income statement while 
the former either as footnotes or in the income statement. Specifically, it required that two 
types of income from non-operating exceptional items: profits on the sale or termination of an 
operation and profits on the disposal of fixed assets to be separately disclosed after operating 
profit on the face of the income statement. The implication is that FRS 3 had more flexible 
disclosure requirements for income from operating exceptional items than non-operating 
exceptional ones. Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker (2007) show that operating exceptional 
items have a broad scope under FRS 3 which allows firms flexibility in the classificatory 
choices of such items. They find that FRS 3 increases the practice of classificatory smoothing. 
The latter result is extended by Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker (2010) who show that 
flexibility in classificatory choices over exceptional items affects managers’ preferences for 
the technique to use in income smoothing. Chan, Lin, and Strong (2011) find that FRS 3 is an 
effective standard that constrains discretionary accruals but not classificatory choices over 
exceptional items. Furthermore, companies were required to show gains from discontinued 
operations in the income statement under FRS 3 but the restrictive definition used for 
discontinued operations created room for managerial discretion. Choi et al. (2007) document 
that FRS 3 improves transparency with regard to non-operating exceptional items but still 
                                                          
3
 Ancillary revenues are generated from the sale of products (services) that are not the main products (services) 
of the company. For example, baggage fees and food or beverage sales at petrol stations are ancillary revenues 
for airline and oil firms, respectively.  
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offers some latitude for managements’ opportunistic discretion regarding operating 
exceptional items and discontinued operations. Taken together, these factors suggest that, 
under FRS 3, non-recurring items such as gains from discontinued operations and income 
from operating exceptional items (e.g. net foreign exchange gains) offered scope for 
classification shifting of revenues. 
In contrast to FRS 3, IFRS requires firms to disclose sales revenue but not operating 
profit in the income statement. IFRS, IAS 18 revenue recognition defines those transactions 
as revenue arising from the ordinary activities of an entity. It captures revenues from the sale 
of goods, the rendering of services, and the use by others of entity assets giving rise to 
interest, dividends and royalties. Nobes (2012) argues that the standard is too broad and 
should exclude items such as interest or dividends because they are not revenue as such but 
instead should be included as a component of income. A consequence of IAS 18 defining 
revenue as all-inclusive is that it allows scope for management to determine what is classified 
as revenue. IFRS (IAS 1) also does not require firms to present finance income separately on 
the face of the income statement and allows them to make their own judgments on the 
classification of such items.4 This lack of guidance and requirements may allow firms to 
engage in classification shifting of revenues by classifying dividends or interest income as 
part of operating revenues. For example, European telecommunication company Deutsche 
Telekom AG classified dividends received as part of operating activities in the cash-flow 
statement in 2006 taking advantage of the flexibility in cash-flow classification under IFRS 
(Gordon, Henry, Jorgensen, & Linthicum, 2017). Although the company did not disclose 
where in the income statement they reported dividends received, the fact that they reported it 
as part of operating activities in the cash-flow statement suggests they included it as part of 
other operating income. Furthermore, IFRS does not require companies to disclose other 
                                                          
4
 An entity may include finance income in operating revenues or in other income subtotals depending on the 
view they take.  
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operating profit or other income subtotals but allows them to do this without providing 
detailed guidance. Zalata and Roberts (2017) document that although companies contend that 
they disclose different types of subtotals allowed but not required by IFRS to help investors to 
understand their profitability, such disclosures may mislead investors. This flexibility is likely 
to offer scope for management to move income statement items between different subtotals 
based on their judgement. For instance, Next plc (Annual Report, 2012) shows rental income 
from operating leases as part of the top income statement line item while Morrison 
Supermarkets (Annual Report, 2013) shows it as part of other operating income.  
The requirements for non-recurring items are more flexible and less rigid under IFRS 
than under UK GAAP. IAS 1 merely provides firms with guidance by stating that an entity 
should disclose non-recurring items either on the face of the income statement or in the notes 
when such items are material. Zalata and Roberts (2016) show that IFRS is less prescriptive 
regarding the disclosure and treatment of transitory items than UK GAAP. The implication is 
that IFRS may encourage firms to classify transitory gains (e.g. gains from the sale of assets/ 
investments) as operating revenues without disclosing them. Alternatively, companies may 
disclose non-recurring gains but not necessarily as part of non-operating revenues depending 
on the view they take about such items allowed by IFRS. For example, one of the world’s 
leading electric utility firms, E.ON, following IFRS shows gains on the disposal of equity 
investments and securities as well as those on the disposal of property, plant and equipment as 
part of operating revenues (Annual Report, 2014). Overall, IFRS permits companies to 
determine operating revenues and non-operating revenues based on the nature of their 
operations (PWC, 2013). This in turn is likely to create scope for potential classification 
shifting of revenues.  
In summary, the above discussion suggests that firms have flexibility to employ 
classification shifting of revenues and the opportunities for this are greater after the 
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introduction of IFRS. Furthermore, this earnings management method may not be subject to 
extensive scrutiny by auditors. This is because the classification of some revenues can be 
subjective due to the flexibility afforded by standards which may limit auditors’ ability to 
challenge managements’ classification. Beattie, Fearnley, and Hines (2015) in their interviews 
with auditors find that when they discussed a particular accounting treatment a major concern 
was whether the treatment complied with the accounting standards or rules. Also, 
classification shifting of revenues does not change bottom-line income which auditors may 
perceive as less important and therefore they may spend less audit effort in identifying or 
adjusting such misclassification (Nelson, Elliott, & Tarpley, 2002). Thus, we expect that firms 
engage in revenue shifting to inflate their operating revenues. We also conjecture that IFRS 
increases this practice as it offers greater scope for classification shifting of revenues than UK 
GAAP, particularly due to its more flexible requirements for non-recurring items and higher 
flexibility in classification choices in revenue recognition. More formally: 
H1: Firms engage in classification shifting of revenues by classifying non-operating 
revenues as operating revenues.   
H2: Firms classify more non-operating revenues as operating revenues in the post-IFRS 
period compared to the pre-IFRS period.   
3. Research design and data 
3.1. Measuring classification shifting of revenues   
In this section, we develop a methodology to measure classification shifting of revenues. 
We expect that operating revenues of firms are inflated in the year in which the components 
of operating and non-operating revenues are not disclosed. We model the level of operating 
revenues and anticipate that unexpected operating revenues (reported operating revenues - 
defined as sales revenue plus other operating revenues - less expected operating revenues) in 
year t increase as non-operating revenues in year t decrease if managers use classification 
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shifting of revenues. Thus, we expect firms that engage in classification shifting of revenues 
to have higher than expected levels of operating revenues in year t. An alternative explanation 
for why non-operating revenues are negatively associated with unexpected operating revenues 
is because of real economic reasons. We distinguish between the two alternative explanations, 
misclassification and economic reasons, by adopting the approach taken by McVay (2006) 
and testing if an increase in operating revenues reverses in the following period. Further 
details of this are provided in section 4.4.2. 
We develop the following model to estimate the expected level of operating revenues:  
,
,	
=  + 

,	
+ 
,	
,
+ , + 
,	
,
+ 
,
,	
+ ,													                          (1) 
where ORi,t is operating revenues for firm i in year t, defined as the sum of sales revenue and 
other operating revenues; ATi,t-1 is total assets; MTBi,t-1 is the market-to-book ratio; ARi,t is 
accounts receivable. 
We construct model (1) based upon the factors that are likely to affect the expected level 
of operating revenues. Our first main variable is lagged operating revenues (ORi,t-1). We 
include this variable to control for operating revenues persistence, consistent with the 
approach taken by McVay (2006) who uses past core earnings to predict current core 
earnings. In general, previous year’s operating revenues are likely to be a good proxy for 
predicting the following year’s operating revenues. This, however, may be a noisy predictor 
of future operating revenues for high growth firms a factor that is not directly considered in 
the McVay (2006) core earnings model. In an attempt to remedy this deficiency, we include a 
lagged market-to-book ratio (MTBi,t-1) to control for growth opportunities (Abdelsalam, 
Dimitropoulos, Elnahass, & Leventis, 2016; Roychowdhury, 2006). Next, we include lagged 
accounts receivable (ARi,t-1) as Sloan (1996) finds that current accruals are negatively 
associated with future earnings performance. Since our model is concerned with estimating 
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operating revenues, it is more appropriate to use accounts receivable rather than total 
accruals5 because the former is likely to be more directly related to operating revenues.6  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) find that there is a positive correlation between 
extreme performance and accrual levels. This suggests that firms with unusually high 
operating revenues are likely to have high accounts receivable. We, thus, also include current-
year accounts receivable (ARi,t) in our model.  Moreover, a large value for accounts receivable 
can also be due to accruals earnings management and so, the inclusion of this variable should 
ensure that we only capture any excess operating revenues associated with classification 
shifting of revenues.7 The inclusion of lagged and current accounts receivable are in line with 
the approach taken by McVay (2006) with the exception that she uses past and current total 
accruals in her model. Similar to studies that estimate earnings management measures, we 
further include a scaled intercept (e.g. Fan & Liu, 2017; Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 
2006).8 This helps to avoid a spurious correlation between scaled operating revenues and 
scaled accounts receivable due to the variation in the scaling variable, total assets. Finally, we 
scale all variables by lagged total assets. We use the latter as a deflator following 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Fan and Liu (2017) who develop models for the expected level of 
core expenses.  
We estimate model (1) cross-sectionally for each industry-year to control for 
macroeconomic and industry shocks similar to other earnings management models (e.g. Fan 
                                                          
5
 The main results do not alter if we use working capital accruals or total accruals instead of accounts receivable 
in model (1). We also tried a model including the change in accounts receivable as an independent variable and 
obtained similar results.  
6
 Stubben (2010) also uses accounts receivable rather than total accruals in his model which is designed to detect 
revenue management via premature revenue recognition where the latter is defined as sales revenue recognized 
before cash is collected using an aggressive or incorrect application of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles.  
7
 This, however, may not directly control for firms’ accruals management practices to inflate operating revenues. 
Furthermore, the latter can also be manipulated via real earnings management (e.g. Gunny, 2010; 
Roychowdhury, 2006) and thus we directly control for firms’ accruals and real earnings management practices 
when we regress unexpected operating revenues on non-operating revenues.  
8
 Our main results do not change if we do not include the scaled intercept.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
16 
 
& Liu, 2017; McVay, 2006). Unexpected operating revenues are calculated as the difference 
between reported and expected operating revenues, where the latter are estimated using the 
coefficients from model (1).  
3.2. Regression model 
Hypothesis 1 states that firms reclassify non-operating revenues as operating revenues. 
Since we anticipate that unexpected operating revenues increase as non-operating revenues 
decrease if managers use classification shifting of revenues, the former is regressed on the 
latter along with the control variables to test Hypothesis 1. The regression equation is: 
				_ !, =  + " !, + #_$% , + #_&'(), + #_*! &, + #_#$, + +,                 (2)                                            
where UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues for firm i in year t; NORi,t is non-operating 
revenues, defined as income-increasing special items9 and discontinued operations plus 
foreign exchange gains plus interest and related income plus other non-operating income 
including rental income divided by lagged total assets. This shows aggregated revenues that 
firms report from non-operating activities. Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative coefficient for  
in regression (2).  
Classification shifting studies in general do not use control variables following the key 
paper by McVay (2006). They, however, do not directly consider the possibility that their 
results might be affected by other types of earnings management methods namely, real 
earnings management and accruals management (e.g. Jones, 1991; Roychowdhury, 2006). As 
we test whether firms inflate operating revenues through classification shifting, we need to 
control for firms’ real activities manipulation and accruals management practices that may 
affect operating revenues. For instance, firms might engage in real earnings management by 
offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms which in turn inflates sales revenue. 
                                                          
9
  Special items capture the major types of non-recurring items including operating exceptional items.  
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Consequently, we add proxies for real activities manipulation and accruals management as 
control variables to regression model (2). More specifically, abnormal levels of cash flows 
from operations (A_CFOi,t), abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (A_DISXi,t), and 
abnormal levels of production costs (A_PRODi,t)10 are included as controls for the measures 
of real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006) while abnormal levels of accruals 
(A_ACi,t)11 are added to control for the proxy of accruals management (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995).12 Finally, we add year indicator variables to control for timing effects (Haw 
et al., 2011; Zalata & Roberts, 2016).  
Hypothesis 2 states that firms classify more non-operating revenues as operating 
revenues in the post-IFRS period compared to the pre-IFRS period. To test this, we add an 
indicator variable, IFRS, that is equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS and zero 
otherwise, and its interaction with the non-operating revenues (NOR) variable to the previous 
regression model (2). Accordingly, the new regression equation is: 
                                                          
10
 A_CFOi,t, A_DISXi,t, and A_PRODi,t are the residuals from the following regressions estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry-year, respectively: 
        
,-,
,	
=  + 

,	
+ 
.,
,	
+ 
∆.,
,	
+ ,													                                                                                                                            
        
01.2,
,	
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
,	
+ 
.,	
,	
+ ,													                                                                                                                                                      
         
30,
,	
=  + 

,	
+ 
.,
,	
+ 
∆.,
,	
+ 
∆.,	
,	
+ ,										                                                         
where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations for firm i in year t; ATi,t-1 is total assets; Si,t is sales revenue; DISXi,t is 
discretionary expenses, defined as selling, general, and administrative expenses plus R&D expenses; PRODi,t is 
production costs, defined as cost of sales plus change in inventory.  
11
 A_ACi,t is the residual from the following regression estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year: 
    				
,
,	
=  + 

,	
+ 
∆.,
,	
+ 
334,
,	
+ ,													                                                                            
where TAi,t is total accruals for firm i in year t, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus cash flow from operations; ATi,t-1 is total assets; ∆SAi,t is the change in sales 
revenue minus the change in accounts receivable; PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant and equipment.  
12
 Our main results do not change if we use working capital discretionary accruals rather than abnormal total 
accruals as the measure for accruals management.  
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_ !, =  + " !, + '%!(, + " !, ×	'%!(, + #_$% , + #_&'(), +
																																		6#_*! &, + 7#_#$, + +,                                                                                              (3)                                                                         
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative coefficient for  in regression model (3).  
3.3. Data and sample  
Data are obtained from Compustat Global for all UK (dead and live) listed firms for the 
period between 1994 and 2014.13  The sample period begins in 1994 because UK firms were 
required to follow FRS 3 (UK GAAP) after June 23, 1993 until mandatory IFRS adoption. It 
is required that firm-years have positive operating revenues and total assets. Following prior 
studies, we exclude financial and utility firms because the former have a different financial 
reporting environment and the latter have more predictable earnings growth. The estimation 
of the expected operating revenues requires two years of lagged data and as a result, the data 
for 1994 are lost. Finally, to make sure that we have sufficient data for the estimation of 
expected operating revenues, we require, following Athanasakou et al. (2009), at least 6 
observations per industry (Global Industry Classification Scheme) year. We winsorize all 
variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels to eliminate the impact of outliers. 
Consequently, our final sample contains 1,786 firms and 12,804 firm-year observations. 
Table 1, Panels A and B show the descriptive statistics of the main variables for the full 
sample and the pre- and post-IFRS periods, respectively. Panel A indicates that the median 
(mean) of unexpected operating revenues is -0.003 (0.000). 
                                                          [Table 1 around here] 
The median (mean) of non-operating revenues is 0.005 (0.018) as shown in Panel A, implying 
that firms report small revenues from non-operating activities. Turning to Panel B, we find 
that the median (mean) non-operating revenues is significantly smaller (larger) for the post-
                                                          
13
  Dead firms are included across the test period to avoid survivorship bias. 
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IFRS period than the pre-IFRS period.14 Regarding the median (mean) unexpected operating 
revenues, there is no significant difference between the pre- and post-IFRS periods.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Main analysis 
Table 2, Panels A and B provide univariate analysis and regression results for testing 
classification shifting of revenues, respectively. 
                                                          [Table 2 around here] 
Panel A shows that how unexpected operating revenues (UE_OR) vary across the different 
quintiles of non-operating revenues (NOR). Firms in the first and second quintiles of non-
operating revenues have positive means but negative medians with the values of the latter 
being close to zero for unexpected operating revenues. The mean and median for unexpected 
operating revenues increase and both become positive in the third quintile. The results for 
these quintiles can be explained by the firm undertaking revenue shifting and reporting small 
non-operating revenues but having, on average, unexpected high operating revenues. The 
mean (median) unexpected operating revenues becomes negative from the fourth quintile 
although it is close to zero for the latter. However, the mean (median) is large and negative in 
the fifth quintile. In these later quintiles firms have economically more significant non-
operating revenues relative to the prior three quintiles.15 Overall, the results suggest that firms 
reporting small non-operating revenues, on average, have positive unexpected operating 
revenues while those reporting relatively large non-operating revenues have negative 
unexpected operating revenues. 
                                                          
14
 Although firms in our sample, on average, report non-operating revenues both in the pre- and post-IFRS 
periods we further check the frequency of disclosing such revenues in these periods. For example, we find that 
only 1,676 sample firm-year observations do not include interest and related income which is one of the main 
components of non-operating revenues. Of this total, 1,080 were in the post-IFRS period. Furthermore, 736 firm-
year observations, that exclude interest and related income, include revenues from other non-operating activities. 
15
 The results for the fifth quintile might be due to economic reasons where firms which are performing poorly 
restructure their operations creating large non-operating revenues whilst their operating revenues are declining. 
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The regression results in column (1) of Panel B show the findings without using controls 
variables to be consistent with existing classification shifting studies (e.g. McVay, 2006). 
Column (1) indicates a significantly negative association between unexpected operating 
revenues and NOR at the 1% significance level.16 This implies that firms engage in 
classification shifting of revenues by misclassifying non-operating revenues as operating 
revenues. We also find very similar results for our main model that controls for firms’ 
accruals and real earnings management practices as indicated by the significantly negative 
coefficient on NOR in column (2). The coefficients on NOR are also economically significant 
in both columns but that in column (2) decreases from -0.484 to the slightly lower value -
0.373 when we account for the potential effects of other earnings management practices. The 
results are consistent with the proposition that financial statement users value income 
statement line items differently and give more value to operating revenues items (Bradshaw & 
Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002). Overall, the results provide evidence in line with Hypothesis 1 that 
firms engage in classification shifting of revenue items.  
4.2. The effect of IFRS on classification shifting of revenues  
Table 3 provides regression results for testing the effect of IFRS on classification shifting 
of revenues.  
                                                          [Table 3 around here] 
The table shows a significantly negative association between unexpected operating revenues 
and NOR, implying that firms misclassify non-operating revenues as operating revenues. The 
post-IFRS effect is explained by the sum of the coefficients on the NOR and NOR×IFRS 
variables. The NOR×IFRS coefficient is significantly negative for unexpected operating 
revenues and also economically significant. It indicates that firms employ classification 
                                                          
16
 Table 2 shows that adjusted R2 is 0.4% in column (1) while it is 1.7% in column (2). These are consistent with 
those reported in existing classification shifting studies (e.g. Fan & Liu, 2017; McVay, 2006). 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
21 
 
shifting of revenues to a greater extent after mandatory IFRS adoption. The coefficient for 
NOR is -0.161 and that on NOR×IFRS is -0.337. Thus, the overall effect of non-operating 
revenues for the post-IFRS period is -0.498 (-0.161-0.337). This demonstrates that IFRS 
adoption increases the use of classification shifting of revenues and supports Hypothesis 2.  
4.3. Firms with strong managerial incentives 
Existing classification shifting studies show that firms with strong managerial incentives 
such as meeting analyst core earnings forecasts or prior period core earnings use expense 
reclassification to a greater extent (Fan & Liu, 2017; McVay, 2006). Firms may use 
classification shifting of revenues to a greater degree when the benefits of misclassification 
are higher, such as, those situations where operating revenues are value relevant. The latter is 
the case for firms reporting losses (Kama, 2004), and so we expect that such firms are likely 
to engage in classification shifting of revenues to a greater degree to inflate operating 
revenues. The benefits of using revenue shifting may also be considerable for firms with low 
growth opportunities. This is because low growth firms are likely to be less closely monitored 
than high growth firms (Lai, 2009). We, therefore, expect that firms with low growth 
opportunities, as measured by low growth in property, plant, and equipment17, employ 
classification shifting of revenues to a greater extent. Alternatively, one might argue firms 
with high growth use more classification shifting of revenues than their counterparts with low 
growth as sales growth is important for the former in securities valuation. To test these 
conjectures, we create the following indicator variables. LOSS is equal to one for firm-years 
that have operating losses, and zero otherwise. LOW_GROWTH is equal to one for firm-years 
that have a change in property, plant, and equipment below the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. We add these indicator variables and their interactions with the non-operating 
                                                          
17
 We also use alternative measures of growth opportunities such as market-to-book ratio, R&D expenses and 
sales growth, and obtain similar results.  
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revenues (NOR) variable to regression model (3). The results are shown in Table 4, column 
(1).  
                                                            [Table 4 around here] 
The column shows significantly negative coefficient on the NOR×LOSS interaction variable. 
The implication is that firms reporting operating losses engage in classification shifting of 
revenues to a greater degree. Column (1) indicates that the coefficient on the 
NOR×LOW_GROWTH interaction variable is significantly negative, suggesting that low 
growth firms use classification shifting of revenues to a greater extent.18 We find similar 
results when we test whether firms with operating losses and firms with low growth employ 
more revenue shifting separately as indicated in columns (2) and (3). Overall, it appears that 
classification shifting of revenues is more pervasive among firms that report operating losses 
or have low growth. 
4.4. Robustness checks   
4.4.1. Alternative specifications for the operating revenues expectation model 
We include accounts receivable in the operating revenues expectation model to control 
for extreme performance. McVay (2006) documents that her core earnings expectation model 
may give biased results due to the inclusion of total accruals. Specifically, she argues that 
noncash income-decreasing special items are part of total accruals and the use of the latter in 
the expectation model may lead to a mechanical relationship between the income-decreasing 
special items and unexpected core earnings. In our study, we may also have a similar issue 
since accounts receivable which we use for estimating unexpected operating revenues may 
include receivables from non-operating activities. In addition, there may be several factors 
                                                          
18
 We also directly test the alternative view that firms with high growth use more classification shifting of 
revenues by adding an indicator variable, HIGH_GROWTH, which
 
is equal to one for firm-years that have a 
change in property, plant, and equipment above the sample median and zero otherwise, and its interaction with 
the non-operating revenues (NOR) variable to regression model (3). The results do not support this alternative 
view.  
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other than the ones we consider in our expectation model that affect operating revenues and 
the omission of these factors may influence our main results. These factors include the change 
in inventories and the change in property, plant, and equipment. Thomas and Zhang (2002) 
document firms with inventory increases have higher growth in operating revenues over the 
prior five years and this trend reverses after the change in inventory. An increase in property, 
plant, and equipment in year t-1 is likely boost operating revenues in year t. This is because 
firms may buy new fixed assets to increase production in the following year.  
Considering the above issues, we test the validity of our main results by estimating 
unexpected operating revenues using three alternative specifications. The first alternative 
specification excludes current-year accounts receivable from the operating revenues 
expectation model as they may contain receivables from non-operating revenues. The second 
specification replaces current-year accounts receivable with current-year production costs and 
discretionary expenses in the expectation model since the latter two items are likely to affect 
operating revenues. The third alternative specification includes the change in inventories in 
year t-1 and the change in property, plant, and equipment in year t-119 in the operating 
revenues expectation model as they may affect operating revenues. We regress these three 
sets of alternative dependent variables on non-operating revenues along with the control 
variables used in the main analysis. The results are presented in Table 5, Panel A.  
                                              [Table 5, Panel A around here] 
 The table shows significantly negative coefficients on the NOR variable in all columns. These 
results indicate that firms reclassify non-operating revenues as operating revenues under all 
sets of alternative variables used to calculate unexpected operating revenues, which is in line 
with classification shifting of revenues. This suggests that our main findings are not sensitive 
to the alternative specifications for the operating revenues expectation model. 
                                                          
19
 The results do not change if we use the change in capital expenditures in year t-1 rather than the change in 
property, plant, and equipment in year t-1. 
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4.4.2. Real economic changes as an alternative explanation  
In this paper, evidence of classification shifting of revenues is presented by documenting 
that there is a negative relationship between unexpected operating revenues and non-operating 
revenues. It is possible, however, that such negative association is due to real economic 
changes. For instance, poorly performing firms may dispose of unprofitable segments or 
subsidiaries which in turn are likely to increase gains from asset disposals. Alternatively, they 
might use the assets of these segments or subsidiaries to generate other sources of income, 
such as rental income, which would result in an increase in non-operating revenues. Both 
cases would yield a negative association between unexpected operating revenues and non-
operating revenues. In order to distinguish between earnings management and real economic 
changes, we examine whether an increase in operating revenues associated with non-
operating revenues in year t reverses in year t+1 in a similar vein to other classification 
shifting studies (e.g. Fan & Liu, 2017; McVay, 2006) which also consider alternative 
explanations for their expense shifting evidence. A reversal of the improvement in operating 
revenues is consistent with a firm’s temporary classification shifting practices rather than with 
real economic changes as non-operating revenues are less likely to arise again in the next 
year. To test this issue, we first estimate unexpected change in operating revenues in year t+1 
by including change in operating revenues in year t-1 in our operating revenues expectation 
model (1) and replacing the dependent variable of operating revenues in year t with change in 
operating revenues in year t+1. We then regress unexpected change in operating revenues in 
year t+1 (UE_∆OR) on non-operating revenues in year t along with the control variables used 
in the main analysis. A negative relationship between them supports classification shifting of 
revenues as it indicates there is a reversal in the following year whereas a positive relationship 
supports the persistence of real economic changes. The results are presented in Table 5, Panel 
B.  
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                                              [Table 5, Panel B around here] 
The table shows that there is a negative relationship between unexpected change in operating 
revenues in year t+1 and non-operating revenues in year t. This implies that firms engage in 
classification shifting of revenues to inflate operating revenues and this reverses in the 
following year. Overall, the findings suggest that our main results should be due to firms’ 
classification shifting of revenues practices. 
4.4.3. Firms with zero non-operating revenues   
We find that in our sample 940 firm-years have zero non-operating revenues.20 Firms 
reporting zero non-operating revenues might be the ones that successfully shift all their non-
operating revenues to operating revenues. Table 6, Panel A indicates that such firms have 
positive mean (median) unexpected operating revenues while firms with non-operating 
revenues have negative mean (median) unexpected operating revenues.  
                                                          [Table 6 around here] 
Furthermore, firms with non-operating revenues have significantly higher mean (median) 
non-operating revenues but significantly lower mean (median) unexpected operating 
revenues. This may lead to the expectation that firms reporting zero non-operating revenues 
employ revenue shifting to a greater extent than their counterparts reporting non-operating 
revenues. To test this, we create an indictor variable, ZERO_NOR, that is equal to one for 
those firm-years that have zero non-operating revenues, and zero otherwise. We regress 
unexpected operating revenues on this indicator variable along with the control variables used 
in the main analysis. Table 6, Panel B indicates that the coefficient on ZERO_NOR is 
significantly positive, suggesting that firms reporting zero non-operating revenues employ 
more revenue shifting than those that report non-operating revenues. 
                                                          
20
 Out of these, 586 firm-years have zero non-operating revenues in the post-IFRS period. This suggests that the 
frequency of non-disclosed non-operating revenues increases following IFRS adoption.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
26 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper examines a novel form of classification shifting as an earnings management 
tool. More specifically, it is the first study that directly investigates whether firms use 
classification shifting of revenues by misclassifying non-operating revenues as operating 
revenues. Firms have incentives to employ this manipulation method as financial statement 
users value income statement line items differently and they give more value to operating 
revenues items (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002). Moreover, an increase in operating 
revenues is valued more highly by investors than a corresponding decrease in operating 
expenses (Ertimur et al., 2003; Marguardt & Wiedman, 2004). Using a sample of 12,804 UK 
listed firm-year observations for the 1995-2014 period, we find that firms engage in 
classification shifting of revenues to inflate operating revenues, in line with the incentives for 
increasing such income statement line items.  
The paper also examines the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the use of 
classification shifting of revenues to determine if it has changed the scope for management to 
engage in this particular form of earnings management. The results indicate that firms engage 
in classification shifting of revenues more to increase operating revenues in the post-IFRS 
period compared to the pre-IFRS period. This suggests that IFRS offers more scope for the 
misclassification of income statement items, in line with Zalata and Roberts (2017). 
Furthermore, our supplementary tests show that classification shifting of revenues is more 
pervasive for firms that report operating losses or have low growth. Overall, the results 
provide evidence that misclassification takes place not only using expense items (Fan & Liu, 
2017; McVay, 2006) but also using revenue items.  
Our results have important implication for both investors and accounting standard setters. 
They can alert investors to a new earnings management tool using classification shifting of 
revenues for inflating operating revenues. This is most likely to occur when a firm does not 
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disclose the components of operating and non-operating revenues in its annual report. Our 
findings imply that, for standard setters, mandatory IFRS adoption has not precluded the 
opportunity with regard to the classification of income statement items. The scope for 
differing interpretations of revenue has recently been recognized by IASB in their publication 
of IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers which comes in to force in 2018 and 
seeks to improve consistency in the reporting of revenue. Finally, although our results show 
evidence of classification shifting of revenues, it is possible that strong corporate governance 
or firms audited by the big four audit firms are deterred from engaging in such earnings 
management method. We leave the investigation of this to future research. Given that the UK 
is an interesting institutional setting but not unique for examining classification shifting of 
revenues, this research issue could also be investigated in other countries. The USA would be 
a particularly interesting setting because of the change in pro-forma reporting after Enron and 
the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Heflin & Hsu, 2008). One would expect that 
greater revenue shifting occurs prior to the above events but this would need to be 
investigated in a further study.  
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                                                         Table 1 
                                                  Summary statistics 
        Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the full sample 
  (1)   (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Variables   Mean           25th  Median  75th  Std. Dev 
       
ORi,t  1.389 0.727 1.188 1.770 0.965 
ORi,t-1  1.441 0.757 1.221 1.836 1.023 
MTBi,t-1    7.483 0.896 1.941 4.591 28.40 
ARi,t  0.239 0.103 0.199 0.320 0.191 
ARi,t-1  0.252 0.107 0.206 0.332 0.211 
UE_ORi,t  0.000 -0.115 -0.003 0.111 0.266 
NORi,t            0.018 0.001 0.005 0.016 0.040 
A_CFOi,t  0.002 -0.053 0.002 0.065 0.121 
A_DISXi,t  -0.004 -0.151 -0.027 0.105 0.252 
A_PRODi,t  0.000 -0.131 0.035 0.175 0.325 
A_ACi,t  0.000 -0.042 0.006 0.052 0.105 
Observations                     12,804   
         Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods 
 
 Pre-IFRS period       Post-IFRS period                           Difference in 
Variables Mean Median  Mean Median    Means  
  (t-test) 
      Medians 
(Wilcoxon test) 
ORi,t 
 
1.480 
 
1.289  
 
1.307 
 
1.093  *** *** 
ORi,t-1 1.536 1.327  1.358 1.127  *** *** 
MTBi,t-1 3.602 1.777  10.94 2.245  *** *** 
ARi,t 0.248 0.209  0.231 0.191  *** *** 
ARi,t-1 0.262 0.218  0.242 0.197  *** *** 
UE_ORi,t -0.001 -0.006  0.000 -0.001    
NORi,t 0.017 0.006  0.019 0.004  *** *** 
A_CFOi,t 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.005    
A_DISXi,t -0.003 -0.021  -0.005 -0.033                                * 
A_PRODi,t 0.001 0.058  -0.001 0.019               *** 
A_ACi,t 0.000 0.006  0.000 0.006                               
Observations                    6,029     6,775    
       Notes: 
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the study. Panels A and B show the 
descriptive statistics of the main variables for the full sample and for the pre- and post-IFRS periods, 
respectively. ORi,t is operating revenues, MTBi,t-1 is market-to-book ratio, ARi,t is accounts receivable, 
UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues, NORi,t is non-operating revenues, A_CFOi,t is abnormal 
levels of cash flows from operations, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, 
A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs, A_ACi,t is abnormal levels of accruals. See 
Appendix A for detailed variable definitions and calculations.  ***/**/* indicate significance at 
1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively.   
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                                                                     Table 2 
                                          Classification shifting of revenues  
                            Panel A: Univariate analysis  
 
 NORi,t              UE_ORi,t                       
Quantiles Mean Median  Mean Median  
       
First       (1) 0.001 0.000  0.005     -0.001  
Second  (2) 0.002 0.002  0.002 -0.001  
Third     (3) 0.005 0.005  0.013 0.002  
Fourth   (4) 0.013 0.012  -0.001 -0.003  
Fifth      (5) 0.069 0.041  -0.021 -0.022  
                             Panel B: Testing classification shifting of revenues 
 (1) (2) 
Variables UE_ORi,t UE_ORi,t 
   
NORi,t -0.484*** -0.373*** 
 (-8.141) (-6.199) 
A_CFOi,t  0.033 
  (1.558) 
A_DISXi,t  0.093*** 
  (9.239) 
A_PRODi,t  0.037*** 
  (4.674) 
A_ACi,t  -0.195*** 
  (-8.265) 
Constant 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.139) (-0.023) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 12,804 12,804 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4% 1.7% 
                             Notes: 
This table shows our analysis for classification shifting of revenues. Panel 
A provides univariate analysis of classification shifting of revenues. Panel 
B shows regression results with year dummies for testing classification 
shifting of revenues. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues, NORi,t is 
non-operating revenues, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from 
operations, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, 
A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs, A_ACi,t is abnormal 
levels of accruals. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions and 
calculations. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate 
significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                                                    Table 3 
                           The effect of IFRS on classification shifting of revenues  
Variables  UE_ORi,t 
  
NORi,t -0.161* 
 (-1.649) 
IFRSi,t 0.011 
 (0.682) 
NORi,t × IFRSi,t -0.337*** 
 (-2.759) 
A_CFOi,t 0.032 
 (1.517) 
A_DISXi,t 0.092*** 
 (9.173) 
A_PRODi,t 0.037*** 
 (4.639) 
A_ACi,t -0.200*** 
 (-8.435) 
Constant -0.003 
 (-0.260) 
Year dummies Yes 
Observations 12,804 
Adjusted R-squared 1.7% 
                               Notes: 
This table shows regression results with year dummies for the effect of 
IFRS on classification shifting of revenues. UE_ORi,t is unexpected 
operating revenues, NORi,t is non-operating revenues, IFRSi,t is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS and 
zero otherwise, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from 
operations, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, 
A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs, A_ACi,t is abnormal 
levels of accruals. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions and 
calculations. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate 
significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                                                   Table 4 
                                           Firms with strong managerial incentives   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables  UE_ORi,t UE_ORi,t UE_ORi,t 
    
NORi,t 0.376*** 0.066 0.161 
 (2.914) (0.618) (1.316) 
LOSSi,t -0.066*** -0.070***  
 (-7.858) (-8.423)  
NORi,t × LOSSi,t -0.256** -0.239*  
 (-2.055) (-1.937)  
LOW_GROWTHi,t -0.006  -0.007 
 (-1.055)  (-1.398) 
NORi,t × LOW_GROWTHi,t -0.499***  -0.513*** 
 (-3.961)  (-4.063) 
IFRSi,t 0.017 0.018 0.010 
 (1.014) (1.077) (0.584) 
NORi,t × IFRSi,t -0.276** -0.364*** -0.250** 
 (-2.234) (-2.990) (-2.021) 
A_CFOi,t -0.059** -0.063*** 0.031 
 (-2.500) (-2.707) (1.446) 
A_DISXi,t 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.087*** 
 (8.916) (9.543) (8.498) 
A_PRODi,t 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 
 (4.485) (4.718) (4.425) 
A_ACi,t -0.275*** -0.276*** -0.202*** 
 (-10.921) (-11.097) (-8.454) 
Constant -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.107) (-0.203) (-0.097) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,604 12,604 12,604 
Adjusted R-squared 2.6% 2.5% 1.9% 
              Notes: 
This table shows regression results with year dummies for firms that have strong incentives 
to use classification shifting of revenues. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues, NORi,t 
is non-operating revenues, LOSSi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have operating losses 
and zero otherwise, LOW_GROWTHi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have a change in 
property, plant, and equipment below the sample median and zero otherwise, IFRSi,t is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS and zero 
otherwise, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, A_DISXi,t is abnormal 
levels of discretionary expenses, A_PRODi,t is abnormal levels of production costs, A_ACi,t is 
abnormal levels of accruals. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions and 
calculations. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at 
1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                                           Table 5 
                                                             Robustness checks  
          Panel A: Alternative specifications for the operating revenues expectation model  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables  UE_OR_ALTER_1i,t UE_OR_ALTER_2i,t UE_OR_ALTER_3i,t 
    
NORi,t -0.719*** -0.376*** -0.403*** 
 (-8.755) (-8.781) (-7.101) 
A_CFOi,t -0.022 0.174*** 0.062*** 
 (-0.765) (11.524) (3.090) 
A_DISXi,t 0.198*** -0.157*** 0.093*** 
 (14.390) (-21.896) (9.803) 
A_PRODi,t 0.022** -0.316*** 0.040*** 
 (2.030) (-55.641) (5.307) 
A_ACi,t 0.177*** 0.157*** -0.160*** 
 (5.498) (9.342) (-7.179) 
Constant 0.0016 0.0022 0.0018 
 (0.096) (0.246) (0.152) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,804 12,804 12,804 
Adjusted R-squared   2.3%   24%   1.8% 
           Panel B: Real economic changes as an alternative explanation   
Variables UE_∆ORi,t+1   
    
NORi,t -0.132**   
 (-2.045)   
A_CFOi,t 0.275***   
 (12.083)   
A_DISXi,t 0.019*   
 (1.884)   
A_PRODi,t 0.035***   
 (4.461)   
A_ACi,t 0.283***   
 (11.130)   
Constant 0.002   
 (0.200)   
Year dummies Yes   
Observations 11,144   
Adjusted R-squared 1.6%   
Notes: 
This table reports regression results for robustness checks. Panel A shows regression results 
with year dummies for classification shifting of revenues using three alternative dependent 
variables. Panel B indicates regression results with year dummies for the alternative 
explanation of classification shifting of revenues practices. UE_OR_ALTER_1i,t is 
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unexpected operating revenues under the first alternative specification, UE_OR_ALTER_2i,t 
is unexpected operating revenues under the second alternative specification, 
UE_OR_ALTER_3i,t is unexpected operating revenues under the third alternative 
specification, NORi,t is non-operating revenues, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows 
from operations, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, A_PRODi,t is 
abnormal levels of production costs, A_ACi,t is abnormal levels of accruals, UE_∆ORi,t+1 is 
unexpected change in operating revenues. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions 
and calculations. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at 
1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                                                 Table 6 
                                          Firms with zero non-operating revenues  
                  Panel A: Descriptive statistics of key variables for firms reporting zero non-operating              
                                                revenues and for firms reporting non-operating revenues  
 
     Firms reporting 
zero non-operating  
revenues 
  Firms reporting 
  non-operating      
revenues  
 
 
            Difference 
                  in 
Variables    Mean   Median           Mean      Median     Means 
 (t-test) 
     Medians 
(Wilcoxon test) 
NORi,t    0.000  0.000  0.023   0.006       ***   *** 
UE_ORi,t    0.018 0.007 -0.002  -0.005       **   *** 
Observations               940         11,864    
 
              Panel B: Testing firms with zero non-operating revenues 
Variables UE_ORi,t   
    
ZERO_NORi,t 0.016*   
 (1.722)   
A_CFOi,t 0.039*   
 (1.848)   
A_DISXi,t 0.094***   
 (9.291)   
A_PRODi,t 0.037***   
 (4.658)   
A_ACi,t -0.218***   
 (-9.322)   
Constant -0.007   
 (-0.522)   
Year dummies Yes    
Observations 12,804   
Adjusted R-squared 1.4%   
  Notes: 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of key variables for firms reporting zero non-
operating revenues and for firms reporting non-operating revenues. Panel B gives 
regression results with year dummies for testing classification shifting of revenues for 
firms reporting zero non-operating revenues. UE_ORi,t is unexpected operating revenues, 
NORi,t is non-operating revenues, ZERO_ORi,t is equal to one for firm-years that have zero 
non-operating revenues and zero otherwise, A_CFOi,t is abnormal levels of cash flows 
from operations, A_DISXi,t is abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, A_PRODi,t is 
abnormal levels of production costs, A_ACi,t is abnormal levels of accruals. See Appendix 
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A for detailed variable definitions and calculations. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***/**/* indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% (two tailed) levels, respectively. 
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                                                                 Appendix A  
                                                         Variables definitions  
Variable                                                         Definition  
  
A_ACi,t Abnormal levels of accruals in year t, derived using the modified Jones (1991) 
model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) 
A_ CFOi,t Abnormal levels of cash flows from operations in year t, derived using the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model 
A_ DISXi,t Abnormal levels of discretionary expenses in year t, derived using the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model 
A_ PRODi,t Abnormal levels of production costs in year t, derived using the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model 
ARi,t Accounts receivable in year t 
ATi,t-1 Total assets in year t-1 
CFOi,t Cash flows from operations in year t 
DISXi,t 
 
IFRSi,t 
 
LOSSi,t 
 
LOW_GROWTHi,t 
 
 
MTBi,t-1 
NORi,t 
 
 
 
ORi,t 
 
PPEi,t 
PRODi,t 
Discretionary expenses in year t, calculated as the sum of selling, general, and 
administrative and R&D expenses 
Indicator variable that is equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS, 
and zero otherwise 
Indicator variable that is equal to one for firm-years that have negative 
operating income before depreciation, and zero otherwise 
Indicator variable that is equal to one for firm-years that have a change in 
property, plant, and equipment below the sample median, and zero 
otherwise  
The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity in year t-1 
Non-operating revenues in year t, defined as income-increasing special items 
and discontinued operations plus foreign exchange gains plus interest and 
related income plus other non-operating income including rental income 
divided by lagged total assets 
Operating revenues in year t, defined as the sum of sales revenue and other 
operating revenues 
Gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t 
Production costs in year t, calculated as the sum of cost of sales and change in 
inventory 
Si,t Sales revenue in year t 
TAi,t 
 
UE_ORi,t 
Total accruals in year t, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus cash flows from operations 
Unexpected operating revenues in year t, calculated as the difference between 
reported and expected operating revenues, where the latter are estimated 
using the coefficients from the operating revenues expectation model 
below: 
      
,
,	
=  + 

,	
+ 
,	
,
+ , + 
,	
,
+ 
,
,	
+ ,													                           
UE_OR_ALTER_1i,t Unexpected operating revenues in year t under the first alternative 
specification, derived by excluding current-year accounts receivable from 
the operating revenues expectation model 
UE_OR_ALTER_2i,t Unexpected operating revenues in year t under the second alternative 
specification, derived by replacing current-year accounts receivable with 
current-year production costs and discretionary expenses in the operating 
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revenues expectation model 
UE_OR_ALTER_3i,t Unexpected operating revenues in year t under the third alternative 
specification, derived by including the change in inventories in year t-1 and 
the change in property, plant, and equipment in year t-1 in the operating 
revenues expectation model 
UE_∆ORi,t+1 Unexpected change in operating revenues in year t, derived by including 
change in operating revenues in year t-1 in the operating revenues 
expectation model and replacing the dependent variable of operating 
revenues in year t with change in operating revenues in year t+1. 
ZERO_NORi,t Indicator variable that is equal to one for firm-years that have zero non-
operating revenues, and zero otherwise. 
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